ABSTRACT A state estimation-based dynamic encryption and authentication (SEDEA) approach is proposed to protect the communication between the control center (CC) and remote terminal units (RTUs) in the smart grid, including the measurements reported from RTUs and the commands sent from the CC. The measurements of power systems are selected to generate encryption keys, which are measured on the RTUs, and estimated on CC using state estimation. With the changes of the power system, each RTU updates its key regularly, and the CC estimates the new keys of all RTUs dynamically and synchronously. The pairs of keys between the CC and each RTU are applied to ensure the confidentiality and integrity of their communication. The advantages of SEDEA could be summarized as follows. First, high security-the keys are difficult to predict and steal, since the power measurements, used to generate the keys, are constantly changing and unpredictable, and would never be exchanged in the network. Second, easy implementation-all measuring equipment on RTU and state estimation on the CC are the legacy of the current power system. And the encryption functions applied in SEDEA are simple and low cost for current devices in the power system, such as XOR, hash, and rounding. Thus, SEDEA is considered as a high-security, inherent and light-weight scheme for Smart Grid. In the experiments, we conduct SEDEA on the four-bus system to show the whole process step by step, including state estimation, key generation, and error correction. And the simulations on the IEEE 39-bus system to analyze the computation cost, error correction, and security of SEDEA.
I. INTRODUCTION
Smart Grid, the mixture of information network and traditional power grid, relies greatly on the information and communication technologies which empower todays power grid with many new features such as observability, controllability, real-time analysis, decision making, and self-healing etc [1] . However, the integration of information network also exposes Smart Grid to many security challenges. As shown in Stuxnet and BlackEnergy3 [2] , the threat of malicious attack, information leaking and data fraud raise profound dilemmas for the development of the new electric power industry [2] - [4] . Besides, the easy accessibility of numerous devices and sensors deployed in the Smart Grid with the public protocols and standards provides attackers with a wealth of information via eavesdropping or tampering with the physical environment [5] . The attackers can compromise power devices, intrude communication network, and break into control system to ruin the whole grid in unpredictable ways.
In recent years, the security and privacy of Smart Grid have attracted more and more attention from both academia and industry. Various techniques have been introduced into Smart Grid cyber communication, such as dedicated network, power line communication, and modern cryptography, etc [6] , [7] . The basic ideas of dedicated network and power line communication are similar, establishing a private network physically or virtually to prevent illegal users access the communication of Smart Grid. However, it is astronomical to build the dedicated network connecting numerous devices in Smart Grid; while applying the power line communication still needs to overcome significant technical challenges to be practical [1] . The cryptography, wildly used in Internet, is considered as a promising solution to secure the communication of Smart Grid without rebuilding new infrastructure. The data is encrypted before transmitted in network to defend data integrity attacks and information leaking. Moreover, the users identify could be authenticated with high security algorithms.
The adversaries can obtain and analyze various power devices, download the encryption manual even the source code from Internet, and easily access and eavesdrop the widespread facilities. Thus, the cryptography is useless to protect Smart Grid against the attackers who obtain the encryption method and encryption key. A practicable solution is to dynamic update the encryption key with the public-key cryptography, in which both parties generate a new random public-private key pair to encrypt the communication at each time [8] . However, it would be costly to deploy the PKI infrastructure for numerous of devices in Smart Grid. Xia and Wang present that applying Public Key Infrastructure (PKI) to Smart Grid requires significant work and maintenance of the public key management. A utility with 5.5 million smart meters requires 500 staff members who can manage approximately 1000 X.509 certificates [9] , [10] .
In this paper, a State Estimation-based Dynamic Encryption and Authentication (SEDEA) approach is proposed to protect the communication between the Control Center (CC) and Remote Terminal Units (RTUs) in Smart Grid. On the RTUs, the measurement data are classified into two categories: 1) the reserved-data. It would not be sent out but applied to generate Dynamic Encryption Key (DEK), and 2) the reported-data. It would be encrypted with the previous DEK and then sent to control center through network. On the CC, the received packets are firstly decrypted with the previous DEK to obtain the latest reported-date on various RTUs. Then, the reported-date are aggregated to estimate the reserved-data on all RTUs using power system State Estimation. The estimated data are applied to update the DEK. Meanwhile, all control commands are encrypted with the latest DEK and then sent out. The RTUs could authenticate whether the commands are sent from the CC with its own DEK. DEK are generated from the measurements of power system, which are measured on the RTUs and estimated on CC using State Estimation. Thus, no information for encryption key distribution and updating is exchanged in the network, which guarantees the security of the encryption key. In the experiments, SEDEA is simulated on a 4-bus system to demonstrate the process of State Estimation, key generation and error correction. And the simulations on IEEE 39-bus system to analyze the computation cost, error correction and security of SEDEA.
The major contributions could be summarized as follow:
• We propose an inherent, light-weight and high security encryption and authentication scheme (SEDEA) to secure the communication in Smart Grid. All measuring equipment on RTU and state estimation on CC are the legacy of current power system. And the encryption functions applied in SEDEA are simple and low-cost for current devices in power system. Moreover, the keys are difficult to predict and steal, since the power measurements, used to generate the keys, are constantly changing and unpredictable, and would never be exchanged in the network.
• A SEDEA implementation is introduced. The magnitude and phase of voltage are selected as the common secret to generate DEK. To enhance the robustness of SEDEA under various environments, such as measurement errors and packet loss, a fault-tolerance module is designed to reduce the influence of measurement noise and Error Correction module is designed to guarantee the consistency of DEK on CC and RTUs through the heuristic search method.
• Simulations are conducted to demonstrate the detailed process of SEDEA on a 4-bus system and the overall performance on an IEEE 39-bus system.
The remainder of this paper is organized as follows. The State Estimation and bad data identification is introduced in Section II. The SEDEA is proposed in Section III. The experiments and analyses are shown in Section IV and V. The possible threats are discussed in Section VI. Related work is reviewed in Section VII. Finally, we draw the conclusions and future work.
II. POWER SYSTEM STATE ESTIMATION
State Estimation is first proposed to continuously monitor the power system to serve as filters against incorrect measurements, data and other information received through the SCADA system in order to maintain the operating conditions in a normal and secure state [11] . Schweppe firstly introduced the concept of State Estimation in power system and proposed Weighted Least Squares (WLS) algorithm [12] . The state variables are related to the measurements as shown
where x = [x 1 , x 2 , . . . , x n ] T is the state variables and
T is the observation function, where h i (x 1 , x 2 , . . . , x n ) is the observation function of x 1 , x 2 , . . . , x n . e = [e 1 , e 2 , . . . , e n ] T is the measurement noises which are assumed to follow Gaussian distribution with zero mean, i.e. e ∼ N (0, R) where R = Eee T is the diagonal measurement covariance matrix.
In power system State Estimation, most commonly used measurements are the branch active power, branch reactive power, bus active power injection and bus reactive power injection, while the state variables are normally the bus voltage magnitude and bus voltage phase. Real-time redundant measurements are applied to estimate the real state of system which can automatically exclude the error message caused by random interference and improve the data accuracy [11] .
The State Estimation problem can be solved as a constrained nonlinear optimization problem [13] . The objective is to find an estimated statex of x which is the best fit of the measurement z according to Equation (1) . Many algorithms are applied to solve this problem, such as WLS, FDLS, LMS, etc. In this paper, the WLS Algorithm is employed and the State Estimation is formulated as a quadratic VOLUME 5, 2017 optimization problem:
Newtons method is applied to solve the quadratic optimization problem. The increment can be calculated by
where
. is the Jacobi matrix and
is the gain matrix. The convergence criterion of IPM is the following:
where ε x is a predefined threshold. Sensor measurements might be inaccurate because of device misconfiguration, device failures, malicious actions or other errors. Chi-squares test is a common approach for detecting bad data according to the measurement residuals:
Assuming that all state variables are mutually independent and the sensor errors follow a normal distribution, the measurement residuals J (x) follows a chi-squared distribution χ 2 (m−n) with m − n degrees of freedom [14] . The steps of the Chi-squares test are given as follows: 1) Solve the WLS estimation problem and compute the measurement residuals J (x). 2) The threshold χ 2 (m−n),p is determined through a hypothesis test with a significance level p(e.g.95%).
(m−n),p , then bad data will be suspected. Else, the measurements will be assumed to be free of bad data. Maximum Normalized Residual Test (RN Test) is often used for bad data identification. The normalized value of residual of measurement i can be obtained by dividing the absolute value of the residual with the diagonal element of covariance matrix:
The normalized residual vector is assumed to follow a standard normal distribution. Thus, the largest normalized residual exceeding the statistical threshold will be suspected with bad data.
The steps of R N Test are shown as follows: 1) Compute the normalized residual of measurements as Equation (6) respectively, after the State Estimation. 2) Find the largest normalized residual r max
where c is a pre-defined threshold, then this measurement will be suspected; else, stop and no bad data will be suspected. 3) Eliminate the measurement with largest normalized residual, resolve State Estimation and go to step 1). All measurements whose normalized residual exceed the statistical threshold will be discarded, until no bad data exists or the system becomes unobservable.
III. STATE ESTIMATION-BASED DYNAMIC ENCRYPTION AND AUTHENTICATION

A. METHOD FRAMEWORK
The basic idea of SEDEA is that both parties update the encryption key dynamically and synchronously, using the measurement data or estimated date of power system. SEDEA is just designed for the traditional Smart Grid, which consists of several Remoted Terminal Units (RTUs) and normally single Control Center (CC). As shown in Fig.1 The RTUs measure various quantities of power system, such as active & reactive power, bus voltage magnitude & phase, etc, and divide them into two categories: the reserveddata and reported-data . The reserved-data is kept at the RTUs to generate the Dynamic Encryption Key (DEK) to encrypt the reported-data transmitted to the CC [11] . Meanwhile, the RTUs also monitor the commands from the CC. Whenever any command is collected, it will be decrypted, identified, and executed if authenticated.
On the CC, the received packets are firstly decrypted with the previous DEK to obtain the latest reported-date on various RTUs. Then, the reported-date are aggregated to estimate the reserved-data on all RTUs using power system State Estimation. The estimated data are applied to update the DEK. Meanwhile, according to the abnormal condition of the data, or some needs from the power system managers, the CC will send control commands to the corresponding RTU. Since the reserved-data would never been transmitted through network, it is difficult for the attackers to obtain it and generate DEK.
The details of SEDEA are introduced in the subsections B and C. Meanwhile, an improved mechanism to the key space is discussed in subsection D. The notations are listed in TABLE 1.
B. REMOTE TERMINAL UNITS
The RTUs are supposed to be the smart meters or other smart appliances, which can measure the power system and transmit the measurements to the CC. As shown in black parts in Figure 2 the measurements on RTU i at time t, D i (t), is divided into reserved-data RSD i (t) and reported-data RPD i (t) [11] . RPD i (t) are encrypted with the previous Dynamic Encryption Key DEK i (t − 1) which is generated at time t − 1. The encryption function can be arbitrarily chosen from existing stream encryption method (RC4, etc.) or blocking encryption method(DES, AES, etc.). Here hash function is adopted to generate DEK, and XOR is adopted as the encryption function, just for simplicity. The Encrypted Reported-data ERPD i (t) will be transmitted through the network to CC.
RSD i (t) is employed to generate the new key DEK i (t). Because of the inevitable and unpredicted errors in measurements, the estimated value in CC may not be precisely equal to the observed data on Smart Terminals. Based on the above issue, a Fault-tolerance module is applied to transform RSD i (t) to RSD i (t). In our work, RSD i (t) is multiplied by a magnifying coefficient K , and then a Floor Function is used to filter the decimal part.
Then, a hash function is employed to transform RSD i (t) to Dynamic Encryption Key DEK i (t).
The hash function spreads the uncertainty of RSD i (t) to the numerous output bits, moreover balances the ratio between ''0'' and ''1'' in DEK i (t).
Since the Dynamic Encryption Key is only known by RTU i and CC, it is also applied to authenticate whether the received command is sent by CC.As shown in red parts in Fig.2 , when the RTU i receives any Encrypted Control Command ECC i (t) from the CC at time t, the Decryption Module is applied to decrypt and authenticate it. If the ciphertext could be decrypted with DEK i (t − 1) and pass the authentication, the Control Command CC i (t) would be sent to RTU i to be executed, else the abnormal condition will be recorded.We will explain how to generate and update DEK i (t − 1) on CC in following subsection.
C. CONTROL CENTER
The process of encryption key updating on CC is shown in Fig.3 . It consists of three major steps: Step 1: the CC decrypts the received cipher text ERPD i (t) with the DEK e i (t − 1) which is generated from last communication. If the decryption is successful, the decrypted results -RPD i (t) will be sent to State Estimation module (Step 2). Meanwhile, the DEK e i (t − 1) is also verified as the same key DEK i (t − 1) on RTU i and sent to DEK Database.Otherwise, they will be sent to Error Correction module (Step 3).
Step 2: The State Estimation module is designed to estimate the reserved-data on all RTUs RSD e (t). WLS algorithm is used to estimate the states of all buses and lines as Equation (2)- (4).Chi-squares test is applied to detect the bad data as (5) . If no bad data are detected, the estimated results will be sent to Fault-tolerance module; else, R N Test will be employed to identify and remove the bad data as (6 (t − 1) successfully, it infers that the DEK on RTU i and estimated DEK on CC are different, i.e., DEK e i (t − 1) = DEK i (t − 1). The major reason of the DEK mismatching is the measurement error. Assuming the error between the estimated data and measurement is ε, the reserved-data on RTU i can be expressed as:
The dynamic encryption key on RTU is
However small the ε is (except for ε = 0), the dynamic secrets on Smart Terminal and CC may be different, which could not decrypt the received cipher text correctly.Considering the observation error in modern measurement system is limited, the Error Correction module is designed to adjust DEK e i (t − 1) through the heuristic search method. The integer around RSD e i (t − 1) is selected to generate new key DEK e i (t − 1) which is employed to decrypt the ciphertext. It is used to replace the false DEK e i (t − 1) in the DEK memory if the decrypted results pass the identification; the next integer is selected to generate key if the identification fails [11] . The maximum trial times try_max is set to stop the key search. It means when the trial times exceeds the threshold, the cipher text might be wrong or tempered under big possibility and then will be abandoned. It will not influence the State Estimation procedure if the amount of the abandoned is not big. The try_max is set according to the measurement accuracy and magnifying coefficient K . In DC model, we can get the upper bound is 2K × a i × φ −1 (1 − α/2) + 3 under the confidence level of 1 − α (Derivation and definition of a i See Appendix). While in AC model, the try_max is also influenced by the system current state, which is not discussed in this paper. When a control command needs to be released to RTU i, denoted by CC i (t), it would be encrypted with DEK i (t − 1). Then, the encrypted command ECC i (t) will be sent by sender, as shown in the red part of Fig.3 .
D. RSD CONCATENATION
The basic idea of SEDEA is introduced in above subsections. However, there exists a severely problem: the key space is insufficient due to the limitation of variation range of RSD. The voltage phase is from −π to π. However, the voltage phase fluctuates within −π/4 to π/4 under the control of electrical facilities in practical operation. Thus, the space of the DEK is 2 * π/4 * K . If the K is 1000, the space of DEK is only 1570, which could be cracked in several seconds. The tradeoff between the error correction and security strength can be achieved by the reserved-data concatenation, advanced error correction algorithm, dynamic encryption key generation mechanism, etc.
A reserved-data concatenation is selected to expand the space of encryption key and avoid the increasing of extra computation cost on terminals. Several sequential previous reserved-data on the same terminal are combined into a new character string to generate Dynamic Encryption Key as follows:
where DEK Cn i (t) is the Dynamic Encryption Key generated on terminal i at time t with the previous Cn reserved-data, and the notion ∧ represents the string concatenation.The faulttolerance algorithm and DEK updating are same [11] .
The concatenation method could significantly increase the security strength of the DEK to (2 × π/4 × K ) Cn , since the phases at different time are independent.
But the type of progressive concatenation mentioned above might be invalid under the following condition. If an attacker luckily cracks an encryption key at time t, which means he has got all the RSD i from time t − Cn + 1 to t, he can easily crack the encryption key at time t + 1, because he only needs to crack RSD i (t +1). A modified method is block concatenation. Namely each block consists of Cn times of communication, and the encryption keys in the same block are same. The common key in each block is generated by all the RSDs in the previous block. During kth block 
IV. A DEMO CASE ON 4-BUS SYSTEM
In the section, we demonstrate how the SEDEA implements on a 4-bus micro power system step by step. As shown in Figure 4 , four branches connected the four buses are numbered 1-4. The measurements include branch active power P, branch reactive power Q, bus voltage magnitude v, and bus voltage phase θ . In present experiments, branch active and reactive powers are selected as the reported-data; phase is selected as the reserved-data (voltage magnitude is not applied since it must keep stable in most power grids). By adding random errors to actual power flow, we generate 3 groups of power system measurements at successive timeslots t 1 , t 2 and t 3 , as listed in Table 2 (Bus 1 is the slack node whose phase is always set as 0).
The coefficient K is set as 100; and the SHA-256, mapping a binary sequence into a 256-bit sequence, is employed as Hash function to generate the Dynamic Encryption Key. Setting the initial key as DEK(T 0 ), we calculate following DEK on RTUs according to equation (7) and (8), as shown in Table 3 (bus 1 is not listed since the phase on the initial node is always 0 and the RSD is same).
According to (10) , the difference of DEK on terminals and CC is influenced by the observation error and magnifying coefficient. Consulting the currently used meters, the observation error is less than 0.2%. Thus, the same level errors are injected into the measurements in the simulation. The measurements and estimated data on four nodes in three moments are shown in Table 3 , where all buses present different measured and estimated phase. Thus, the CC has to search the correct Reserved-data and generate the DEK. The ST coef represents the times of searching with magnifying coefficient coef . In this section, the coefficient 100 is selected to calculate the cost of Reserved-data searching [11] .
As shown in Table 3 , RSD 3 (t 1 ) and CC RSD e 3 (t 1 ), the Reserved-data for key generation on bus 3 at time t 1 , are -201 and -202, respectively. Thus, the CC would try to decrypt the ciphertext from the device on bus 3 with the key generated with -201, -202 and -200, in turn. The ciphertext would be decrypted successfully at third attempting, where the searching times (ST ) is 3. On average, the DEK could be recovered within 2 times in the demo case.
V. EVALUATION
The basic steps of SEDEA are demonstrated on a 4-bus system. In this section, we further analyze the efficiency and security of SEDEA on a larger power system to answer following questions: Q1: Can the SEDEA handle various measurement errors? The measurement errors on various meters are different. How many searching times could the CC find the correct DEK ? VOLUME 5, 2017 Q2: How to deal with emergency situations, such as the device failures or the measurements manipulated by an adversary?
Q3: What are the advantages of SEDEA, compared with wildly implemented encryption methods?
To address these questions, we conduct SEDEA on IEEE 39-bus system, as shown in Section A. Then, we investigate the performance of SEDEA under various measurement errors, packet loss situations and attacks. Finally, we discuss the comparison among SEDEA, AES and 3DES in Section D.
A. EXPERIMENT SETTING
In this section, we carry out substantial experiments on 39-bus system to analyze the performance of SEDEA method. The system consists of 39 buses and 46 transmission lines, which means there are 77 reserved-data (39 voltage magnitude measurements and 38 voltage angle measurements on buses) and 184 reported-data (92 pairs of reactive/active power flow measurements on transmission lines). A day is divided into 48 consecutive 30-minute timeslots and 20 sets of measurement noise are generated for each time. At each time, the measurement noise is added to the real value of power flow to generate 20 sets of measurements, and accordingly 20 sets of state variables are estimated at CC. A set of measurement z at time t is generated as follows: ] denotes kth set of measurement noise which is assumed to follow Gaussian distribution of zero mean, i.e. e k t ∼ N (0, σ 2 ) where σ 2 is relevant to the accuracy of the meter; t = 1, . . . , 48; k = 1, . . . , 20.
B. MEASUREMENT ERROR
The error correction module is used to restore the estimated value to the measured value. Intuitively, both of the security strength and the cost of error correction increase with the magnifying coefficient, which raises a trade-off problem. In addition, meter accuracy has an influence on error correction as well. Hence, the selection of the magnifying coefficient and the meter accuracy comes under consideration.
We carried out several sets of experiments with 6 different accuracy classes (0.05%, 0.1%, 0.2%, 0.5%, 1% and 2%), as shown in Table 4 . Currently, the accuracy classes of most smart meters are from 0.1% to 1%, such as GE EMP 6000 & 7000 [15] , Siemens PAC 4200 [16] and Schneider PM800 [17] . α denotes the accuracy class of the meters in the system. In the first 6 rows, we assume all meters in the system are the same and with unified accuracy class. In the last 2 rows, we consider the meters are different and with two accuracy classes. For example, in the Row 7, half of the totally 38 meters are with 0.05%-accuracy and another half are with 0.1%-accuracy. ST coef presents the average Searching Times of each bus under various magnifying coefficient (K = 100, 500, 1000, 10000). It can be observed that the number of searching times is dramatically less by using higher-accuracy meters with the same coefficient.
It can be easily obtained that the mixed deployment performs well since the result of searching times in multiaccuracy case is acceptable. And the searching times could be reduced by replacing the low accuracy meters with higher one. For example, if we replace 50% low-accuracy meters (α = 0.2%) to high-accuracy ones (α = 0.05%), the average Searching Times could be reduced from 4.526 to 3.421 (about 24%). Thus, an optimization of meter selection and deployment may provide better result when the total budget is limited.
C. MANIPULATED MEASUREMENTS
In real system, we need to consider how to deal with the wrong data, caused by the device failures or adversary attacks. Different from measurement errors, the wrong data usually deviate far from the real data. In SEDEA, the state estimation and bad data detection method are used to estimate the real state and discard the bad data, as discussed in Section III. Two experiments are designed to demonstrate how the SEDEA works under device failures and attacks. At last, we evaluate the resilience of SEDEA under manipulated measurements.
Firstly, we show an energy theft case. The adversary on bus 8 launches an attack to move his power consumption to the user on bus 5 . The load on bus8 is decreased by about 795 MW, and the load on bus 5 is increased by 795 MW; meanwhile, P 5,8 (active power from bus 5 to bus 8 ) is modified from -398.47MW to -1195.41MW and P 8,5 is modified from 397.17MW to 1191.51MW. These changes are used to balance the power consumption and power flow of whole system. The K is set as 1000 and α is 0.05%. According to the state estimation in Equation (2), all estimated state with the modified measurements would be quite different from the measured state. As shown in Figure 5 , the average Searching Times is about 100 under attack; however, it is only 2.895 without attack (α=0.05% and K=1000 in TABLE 4). When the Bad Data Detection (BDD) is applied to detect and remove the false data, the differences between estimated and measured states are dramatically reduced. The average Searching Times is no more than 5 (bus 3 1 is the slack node whose phase is always set as 0). In the second experiment, we changes the measurements through randomly selected 12 transmission lines to simulate the device failure or coordinated attacks. For each transmission line, the active powers are modified to 3 times of its original value and then record the total number of Searching Times. Table 5 shows the average searching times of SEDEA scheme with BDD and without BDD. It can be observed that the searching times drop significantly using BDD. Moreover, meter accuracy has less influence on searching times.
As shown in these two cases, the SEDEA can recovery from partial wrong data caused by device failures or malicious attacks. Moreover, the detection results of BDD can also inform the operators which RTUs are high-risk.
In the third experiment, we evaluate the effectiveness of SEDEA under manipulated measurement by the MonteCarlo simulations. Fig.6 shows the probability of successful recovery under different manipulated data percentage. In this experiment, we consider two cases: in Case A, several meter data are manipulated (which are referred to as Meter Data in the figure) ; in Case B, several buses are manipulated and then all the data on these buses are manipulated (which are referred to as Bus Data). From the figure, the probability of successful decryption decreases with the manipulated data percentage, which is consistent with intuition. The results of Case A and Case B shows a good consistency. When the number of manipulated data is 1, the SEDEA can always recovery both in the Case A and Case B. When the manipulated data percentage is less than 8%, i.e., 15 meter data out of totally 184 reported-data in Case A and 3 bus data out of 38 bus data in Case B, the probability of successful decryption is larger than 90%.
Note that the attacker can generally manipulate a small percentage of data in real situation. Thus, the SEDEA shows a good resilience against malicious attack.
D. SECURITY DISCUSSION
AES and 3DES are widely used symmetrical encryptions in power system wireless links [18] , [19] .We compare the SEDEA with them from four aspects: complexity of algorithm, encryption key updating process, key lifecycle, and the threat of key exposure, as shown in Table 6 .
Complexity: the SEDEA implements one multiplication, floor, Hash and XOR operations to update the encryption key, and applies one XOR to encrypt the data during each whole process. However, a round of optimized AES needs 16 table lookups and 16 32-bit XOR operations. 3DES is much more complicated than AES. Obviously, the complexity of SEDEA is much lower than AES and 3DES.
Key Updating: SEDEA employs dynamic key rather than static key to enhance the security and survivability with the highlight that: SEDEA does not need complex dynamic key management, but utilizes the physical measurement of power system to update the key at local. In AES and 3DES, the key updating is a tough work for the users and administrators. If the devices support remote encryption updating, a trusted third party should be built to provide the updated key; otherwise, we need hundreds of engineers to operate every meter manually.
Key Lifecycle: In SEDEA, the key could be generated automatically and synchronously on both sides of communication with the measurement updating. Thus, the cycle of encryption key updating can be as high as one or Cn(in concatenation type) time per transmission. In common power system security mechanisms, the lifetime of the encryption key is several months or longer, since the cost of key updating.
Security Issues: Considering the collusion problem referred in [20] , the threat of key exposure is low in SEDEA since: 1) the keys on all the terminals update frequently, therefore, it is impossible for the attackers to follow; 2) the measurements are independent on each terminal, thus, it is impossible for the attackers to predict or estimate the keys on other terminals; 3) moreover, even if the adversary completely controls a terminal and launches a impersonate attack to report false measurement to CC, the bad data can be detected, identified and then deleted before the key generation, which is a traditional segment of State Estimation in power system [11] .
Last but not least, SEDEA is considered a scheme with excellent scalability, namely the expansion of the system will not affect the operation of the terminals, for the reason that: 1) every terminal generates and stores its own key, which means the leaving or joining of some terminals will not compromise the security of the system; 2) the procedure of data decryption for each terminal on CC can be processed in parallel, since the state variable on each terminal is independent. Whats more, SEDEA can be extended from existing State Estimation methods.
VI. THREAT TO VALIDATE
As mentioned in section III and IV, SEDE has considerable advantage over Complexity, Key Updating, Key Exposure Threat and Node Updating. Meanwhile, it has much robustness on the measurement error, measurement distortion, data tampering, or even data loss, due to the State Estimation Mechanism. But, there are still minority situations that might have threats to the validity of SEDE.
A. FROM ASPECT OF DATA Some elaborately constructed attacks, which are specially aiming at the weakness of state estimation [21] - [23] , called False Data Injection Attack and Topology Attack. An adversary alters measurement data from the true values to the forged, according to the methods as previously mentioned. These types of attacks can completely bypass the bad data detection mechanism and mislead the Control Center with an incorrect network state and topology.
These types of attacks seem perfect only from the aspect of maths, however they have great limitations in actual operation. The attackers must be able to control or track at least two RTUs, which must meet certain constrains in physical topology. In addition, these types of attacks are theoretically hard to construct in AC mode, due to the unavailability of true state. Meanwhile, these types of attacks might be detected by means of network attack detection (e.g. Intrusion Detection System ).
B. FROM ASPECT OF NETWORK
In the power system using SEDE, either the measurement data or the control command is transmitted in the network environment. Some network attacks, which are aimed to interfere with the network data transmission or access permissions by network intrusion, can do huge harm to normal operation of SEDE. Denial of Service (DoS) attack is one of the most common types. DoS attack usually appears in the traditional network, Software Defined Network or various types of cyber physical systems. It can prevent the valid users from accessing the network service normally. The attacker sends plenty of false message to the server until the buffer is full, so the server has no more ability to deal with new demand. The influence of DoS attack couldnt be reduced effectively only by SEDE, but might be reduced by many existing countermeasures.
Its really hard or impossible to completely forbid these network attacks, due to the complexity of network. While, some measures might be beneficial for it, employing advanced network defense mechanisms, promoting the safety awareness of personnel in critical department, updating pitch already announced periodically, utilizing the technology of software vulnerability exploitation, for example.
VII. RELATED WORK
Encryption and authentication play a significant role in improving the integrity and confidentiality of the data in Smart Grid [24] . The US National Institute of Standards and Technology lays out the guidelines for developers and policy makers, and explains the encryption and key management issues in the Smart Grid [25] .
Symmetric and asymmetric cryptographies are widely employed to prevent Smart Grid from various possible threats. For example, ZigBee employs 128-bit AES encryption for security [26] . Since the computation cost of symmetric cipher is lower than asymmetric encryption, it is used to handle large amounts of data. However, its lifespan is shorter and need to update in time. Many researchers try to asymmetric encryption to update the encryption key [26] . Li et al. present a secure information aggregation approach for Smart Grid. When the smart meters submit their own data and forward others data, the homomorphic encryption is employed to ensure that intermediate results are not revealed to any device and route [1] . Cao et al. propose a layered encryption mechanism based on hash chain technology for protecting sensitive data, which is also lightweight for encryption and convenient for key management [27] .
Key management is a challenging and necessary issue in utilizing cryptographic algorithms for the Smart Grid. Tsai and Lo utilize an identity-based signature scheme and an identity-based encryption scheme to propose an anonymous key distribution scheme for Smart Grid environments. The meter accesses services anonymously, provided by service providers, using one private key without the help of the trusted anchor during authentication [7] . Kim and Choi introduce an efficient and scalable key management protocol for secure unicast, multicast, and broadcast communications in Smart Grid, based on a binary tree to manage secret keys shared among entities [10] . Jiang et al. propose a robust and efficient group key management scheme, called LiSH to simultaneously resolve the transmission security and availability in SCADA group communications. A secure selfhealing mechanism with t-revocation capability is developed, in which an one-way function is applied to protect current session keys from being attacked by intruders [28] . Law et al. propose a comprehensive key management scheme, named as WAMS key management (WAKE), to secure WAMS communications. For security objectives involving unicast, WAKE employs industry-standard security protocols. For multicast, we show the scheme standardized by the IEC is inadequate, and identify multicast authentication as a requirement [29] . Seo et al. propose an efficient encryption key management mechanism for end-to-end security. By applying public key cryptography for smart meter key management, the overhead of certification at the utility could be eliminated [30] . Yu et al. design information centric networking approach on AMI (ICN-AMI). A key management scheme for a large number of smart meters is developed to ensure confidentiality, integrality, and authentication [31] . All of these methods rely on a third party for identity authentication or key generation. It might cause additional equipment cost and communication traffic.
A secure and efficient authorization scheme is important for operators to prevent various attacks in Smart Grid. Saxena et al. design a Smart Grid authentication and authorization scheme to prevent outsider and insider threats. When a user accesses one device, the role of the user would be computed dynamically using an attribute-based access control. And the identity of the user would be verified with the device [32] . Time-Valid One-Time-Signature (TV-OTS) is applied to design a data authentication protocol for Smart Grid applications. TV-OTS is highly configurable with computationally lightweight signing and verification processes, making it a strong candidate for Smart Grid use [33] . Nicanfar et al. proposes an efficient authentication scheme for the smart meter in a home area network and the server in Smart Grid. It decreases the number of steps in the secure remote password protocol from five to three and the number of exchanged packets from four to three [34] . Saxena and Grijalva design an efficient signature scheme to protect the integrity and security of command from control center to RTUs. It also provides sender authenticity by verifying the signatures at the RTU/IED. Both random and malicious commands sent could be detected and discarded [35] .
Many researchers focus on the special characteristics of the Smart Grid systems and propose lots of novel methods. To protect the Home Area Network (HAN), an anonymous secure framework (ASF) is developed for smart home environments, using solely lightweight operations [36] . Dan et al. develop a secure and light-weight scalable security protocol that allows a power system operator to collect data from measurement devices. The security protocol trades off between computations and device memory requirements [37] . To improve the efficiency and security of AMI, a security framework is proposed using bit masking technique for collecting the smart meter data in AMI communication. It could be used for trust services, confidentiality and integrity through data encryption and authentication services [38] .
VIII. CONCLUSION AND FUTURE WORK
A State Estimation-based Dynamic Encryption and Authentication (SEDEA) scheme is proposed to secure the communication between the Control Center (CC) and Remote Terminal Units (RTUs) in Smart Grid. The general idea of SEDEA is the observed and estimated power system states are employed as a pair of common secrets at RTUs and CC to update the encryption key automatically and synchronously. Since both encryption key and secrets have never been transmitted in network, it is difficult for the adversary to steal and track the encryption key. Moreover, the state estimation and bad data detection are widely deployed in current power system. SEDEA would not introduce extra module and new heavycomputing tasks into system. As a word, SEDEA is a highsecurity, inherent and light-weight encryption scheme for Smart Grid.
However, some of the results in this paper are conducted under ideal experiment. Even though the measurement data for experiment is obtained from actual power system, the measurement error, measurement distortion, data tampering, or data loss is constructed manually. The going of SEDEA in actual power system will still be judged by more complex experiments or operations in actual environment. Furthermore, some threats and possible countermeasures to the validity of SEDEA are just analyzed theoretically, which will also be tested in the future.
APPENDIX
In DC model, the state equation of power system is shown as follows:
where z, x and e have the same implications with those in (1), and H is a full rank matrix to estimation x from z [Wood and Wollenberg 1996]. Thenx, the estimated valued of x, can be expressed as follows:x
To substitute (a1) for (a2), we can get:
where H inv = (H t −1 H ) −1 H t −1 . Let x be the measurement value, then
where e = [ e 1 , e 2 , . . . , e n ] is the measurement noise of x, which is assumed to follow Gaussian distribution with zero mean, i.e. e i ∼ N (0, σ 2 i ). Then the difference betweenx and x follows Gaussian distribution as follows: Let the operation hat be the processing in fault-tolerance module, e.g. x = x * K . We can get
Supposing that we try firstly the nearer and then the smaller integer in the heuristic search method in the Error Correction module, then the collision times t i is shown as follows:
where the operation {·} denotes the decimal part of a value, e.g., x = x − x . Let rx i be the absolute value of the difference betweenx i and x i , i.e. rx i = |x i − x i |, FRX i be the cumulative probability function of RX i , and rx i,α be the underside α-quartile of RX i , then
To substitute (a10) for (a9),we can get the upper bounder (under the confidence level of 1 − α) of t i is 2K × a i × φ −1 (1 − α/2) + 3.
